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Drafting a Limited Liability Clause that Will Pass the 
Scrutiny of the Utah Courts* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Limited liability clauses contractually limit a party's liability. Thfs 
comment will address four types of limited liability clauses: releases, 
exculpatory clauses, indemnity clauses, and limitation of damages 
clauses. 
A release is a clause liberating one party from any liability to the 
other party in a contract. This type of clause is often found in standard 
form contracts, such as rental agreements between a ski-renter and a 
skier. An exculpatory clause is similar to a release, except that it is often 
created between two parties that have entered into a uniquely drafted 
contract bargained for at arms length. These are common in construction 
or service contracts. The third type of clause, an indemnity clause, is 
used when a party promises to protect another from third party liability. 
Finally, a limitation of damages clause fixes a maximum amount an 
injured party may recover, regardless of the amount of damages the party 
can prove. 1 
Traditionally, limited liability clauses have not been favored by Utah 
courts. 2 This comment will first discuss the common-law rule regarding 
the validity of these clauses. Second, it will discuss the history 
underlying the use of limited liability clauses in Utah, focusing on the 
standards set forth by the courts over the past half-century. Finally, it 
will explore how a legal practitioner can draft a clause that will pass the 
scrutiny of Utah courts. 
II. THE COMMON-LAW RULE 
Under the common-law majority rule, limited liability clauses are 
valid unless they go against public policy in the narrow circumstances of 
* Copyright <C> 1996 Trey Dayes. These concepts were originally compiled in a memo 
on how to defeat limited liability clauses in Utah and Wyoming written by Trey Dayes and 
edited by Shawn Gunnerson for the law firm of Walstad & Babcock, Provo, Utah. They are 
used with the firm's consent. 
1. 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 1068 (1964). 
2. Union Pacific R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 913 (Utah 1965). 
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an employer-employee relationship or where one is "charged with a duty 
of public service . . . . "3 This rule applies to releases, exculpatory, 
indemnity, and limitation of damages clauses equally.4 
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF LIMITED LIABILITY CLAUSES IN UTAH 
Utah courts have interpreted limited liability clauses inconsistently, 
occasionally applying different standards to clauses containing nearly 
identical language. This section will review Utah case law addressing 
indemnity clauses, exculpatory clauses, and limitation of damage clauses. 
Additionally it will explore how limited liability clauses are treated in the 
federal courts, and the special exceptions that apply. 
A. El Paso and Freund 
1. El Paso: The Clear Expression Standard 
The Utah Supreme Court outlined Utah's original rule for indemnity 
clauses in a 1965 case called Union Pacific Railroad v. El Paso Natural 
Gas Company.5 In this case, Union Pacific paid damages to one of El 
Paso's employees who was struck by Union Pacific's train. 6 Union 
Pacific later sought payment from El Paso under an indemnity provision 
between the two. The provision stated that El Paso "would indemnify 
and hold the Union Pacific harmless ... from and against any and all 
liability, loss, damage, claims, ... of whatsoever nature. "7 The court 
held the clause invalid, stating that "[t]he majority rule appears to be that 
in most situations, where such is the desire of the parties, and it is clearly 
understood and expressed, such a covenant will be upheld. "8 Thus, 
while the court followed the common-law majority rule, 9 it added a new 
requirement that the clause be "clearly understood and expressed." 
Twelve years later, in a 1977 case called Union Pacific Railroad v. 
Intermountain Farmers, 10 the court followed El Paso clear-expression 
standard to invalidate a clause which stated that the "[l]essee shall at all 
times protect the Lessor and the leased premises from all injury, damage 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. 408 P.2d 910 (Utah 1965). 
6. ld. at 911. 
7. Id. at 912 (alterations in original). 
8. Id. at 914. 
9. See supra Part II. 
10. 568 P.2d 724 (Utah 1977). 
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or loss. " 11 The court cited El Paso and stated that clear intention "is 
not achieved by inference from general language." 12 
In the 1983 case of Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling 
Co. , 13 the court again cited the El Paso standard when it upheld an 
indemnity clause that was similar to the clause invalidated in El Paso. 
The clause at issue stated that "Contractor [Brinkerhoff] agrees to protect, 
indemnify and save Operator [Shell], its employees, and agents harmless 
from and against all claims, demands, and causes of action of every kind 
and character." 14 In its holding, the court looked to the El Paso clear 
expression standard, stating that "[t]he indemnity provision challenged 
here meets [the El Paso] requirement, and is upheld under those authori-
ties." 15 
2. Freund: The Negligence Standard 
In 1991 the Utah Supreme Court introduced a modified El Paso 
standard when it decided Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co. 16 In 
Freund, the court upheld an indemnity clause which said that "Licensee 
[Jones] shall indemnify, protect, and save harmless Licensor [UP & L] 
from and against any and all claims demands, causes of action, costs or 
other liabilities," 17 stating that "[i]n a long line of cases spanning more 
than fifty years, we have repeatedly held that an indemnity agreement 
11. /d. at 724-25. 
12. /d. at 726. 
13. 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 n.1 (Utah 1983). 
14. /d. at 1189 n.l. 
15. /d. at 1189. In spite of the court's holding, however, an argument can be made that 
Shell Oil actually clouded the El Paso standard in two ways. First, the Shell Oil court claimed 
to use the same rule as El Paso, but arrived at the opposite result. Though the words of the 
two clauses were not identical, their effect was similar. The clause in El Paso said that 
defendant would indemnify and hold the Union Pacific harmless "from and against any and all 
liability, loss, damage, claims, ... of whatsoever nature." Union Pacific R.R. v. El Paso 
Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah 1965)(alteration in original). Similarly, the clause 
in Shell Oil says, "[c]ontractor [Brinkerhoff] agrees to protect, indemnify and save Operator 
[Shell]. its employees, and agents harmless from and against all claims, demands and causes 
of action of every kind and character." Shell Oil, 658 P.2d at 1198 n.1. 
Second, the court's dicta in Shell Oil stated that "[i]ndeed, the contention that contracts 
of indemnity violate public policy by inducing negligence has been rejected by more that one 
court as 'fanciful' or 'untenable' in view of the many automobile liability insurance policies in 
existence." /d. at 1189. The court left unanswered the question of whether Utah still "does 
not look with favor" upon these clauses. See El Paso, 408 P.2d at 913. 
16. 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990). 
17. /d. at 371. This clause was similar to the El Paso clause which said "that the defen-
dant would indemnify and hold the Union Pacific harmless ... from and against any and all 
liability, loss, damage, claims, ... of whatsoever nature." El Paso, 408 P.2d at 912 (alter-
ations in original). 
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which purports to make a party respond for the negligence of another 
should be strictly construed." 18 
The court noted that "there is a growing trend to relax some of the 
strictness of the rule of construction when the indemnity arises in a 
commercial context. " 19 Additionally, the court continued, "it is not 
necessary that the exculpatory language refers expressly to the negligence 
of the indemnitee, so long as the intention to indemnify can be 'clearly 
implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement, and the 
surrounding facts and circumstances. "'20 This new twist on El Paso 
implies that word 'negligence' effectively shows clear intent. 21 
3. Cases After Freund 
The El Paso rule requires that the clause be very specific; indeed, 
intent must be "clearly and unequivocally expressed. "22 Freund relaxes 
that rule in commercial settings. In Freund, intent or the word negli-
gence can be implied "from the language and purposes of the entire 
agreement, and the surrounding facts and circumstances. "23 
Though Freund arguably set forth a new standard regarding 
indemnification clauses in commercial settings, few courts followed it. 
For example, in Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc. 24 the Utah 
Court of Appeals found that a clause indemnifying the State by a 
construction company did not cover the engineering company hired by the 
18. Freund, 793 P.2d at 370 (citing Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 
658 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1983)); See also Union Pacific R.R. v. Intermountain Farmers 
Ass'n, 568 P.2d 724, 725-26 (Utah 1977); Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen, 420 P.2d 848, 849 
(Utah 1966); Union Pacific R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 913-14 (Utah 
1965); Barrus v. Wilkinson, 398 P.2d 207, 208 (Utah 1965); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. 
First Security Corp., 341 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah (1959); Jankele v. Texas Co., 54 P.2d 425 
(Utah 1936). 
19. Freund, 793 P.2d at 370. 
20. /d. 
21. Two things can be inferred from Freund. First, a new rule exists for indemnity 
clauses in commercial transactions bargained for at arm's length; namely, that intent "can be 
'clearly implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement, and the surrounding 
facts and circumstances."' Second, for a clause to meet the clear and unequivocal expression 
test of El Paso, the word 'negligence' should appear in the clause. 
Reviewing El Paso and Intermountain Farmers, the word negligence is not in their clauses. 
See El Paso, 408 P.2d 910; Union Pacific R.R. v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 568 P.2d 724 
(Utah 1977). Perhaps this was why they were found invalid. Conversely, in Shell Oil the 
clause does say "except where such injury, death or damage has resulted from the sole 
negligence of Operator." Shell Oil, 658 P.2d at 1189. Thus, inclusion of negligence is more 
clear in the Shell Oil case than in the El Paso and Intermountain Farmers, allowing this clause 
to pass the El Paso rule. 
22. Union Pacific R.R. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 914. (Utah 1965). 
23. Freund v. Utah Power and Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990). 
24. 820 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1991). 
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State as an independent contractor. In construing the clause, the Court 
of Appeals cited El Paso25 but made no reference to Freund, even 
though Freund could easily have been applied. 26 
Two years later the court of appeals again ignored Freund in favor 
of El Paso. In Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corporation27 two 
commercial entities entered into a contract where Weyher-Livsey, the 
contractor, was to indemnify Kennecott, the owner. Although Freund 
was cited as the controlling authority of the case, the court looked to El 
Paso to hold that the clause was valid. Following the El Paso holding, 
the court declared that: 
The law is clear that indemnification agreements should be strictly 
construed against the drafter. The reason an indemnification agreement 
is strictly construed "seems to have arisen primarily to appease the 
concern that one who is not financially responsible for the consequences 
of his or her own negligence will be less careful in his or her behavior 
toward others." "A party is contractually obligated to assume ultimate 
financial responsibility for the negligence of another only when that 
intention is 'clearly and unequivocally expressed.'" The presumption 
is against assuming financial responsibility for the negligence of another 
and "it is not achieved by inference or implication from the general 
language. "28 
The court ignored the language in the Freund case stating that this 
standard has been relaxed in commercial situations and a court can imply 
the negligence language "from the purpose of the entire agreement, and 
the surrounding facts and circumstances. "29 However, the proper result 
was still achieved because the clause passes the stricter El Paso rule. The 
court stated: 
This indemnification agreement, while somewhat convoluted, is 
less equivocal than the indemnification agreement in Freund because it 
specifically requires Weyher-Livsey to indemnify Stearns for losses and 
expenses incurred by reason "of negligence or any other grounds of 
legal liability . . . on the part of [Weyher-Livsey, Kennecott, or 
25. !d. at 494. 
26. Under Freund, the clause would still have been invalidated because the "surrounding 
facts and circumstances" indicated that the clause did not extend to the engineer. Freund, 793 
P.2d at 370. Thus the court reached the proper result without applying the proper rule. 
However, the court's analysis leaves some question as to when El Paso applies and when 
Freund applies. 
27. 858 P.2d 1005 (Utah App. 1993), rev'd, 886 P.2d 49 (Utah 1994)(reversing on 
grounds unrelated to the indemnification agreement). 
28. !d. at 1008 (citations omitted). 
29. Freund v. Utah Power and Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990). 
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Stearns]." We conclude therefore that this agreement expresses a clear 
and unequivocal intent. 30 
This is clearly the El Paso standard instead of the Freund standard. 
The recent case of Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 31 did little to 
resolve the question concerning which standard should apply. In fact, the 
Utah Supreme Court only added to the confusion with this case. In 
Ericksen, a contractor agreed to indemnify the City of Salt Lake. The 
Court invalidated the indemnity clause, but failed to mention whether 
Freund or El Paso should apply. The court compared the Ericksen 
indemnity clause to the clause found valid in Freund, stating that in 
Freund, "the contract of indemnity was much broader in its sweep than 
what we find in the instant case. "32 
This "broader in sweep" language is confusing because there has 
never been a requirement that the language be "broader in its sweep"33 
as the court in Ericksen suggests. That certainly was not in the analysis 
of the Freund decision. Thus, it is unclear whether the court was 
misapplying Freund or if it was introducing a new rule for indemnity 
clauses. 34 
B. Exculpatory Clauses 
Under the common-law majority rule, all clauses limiting liability 
should be treated in the same way. In Utah, however, this may not be 
so, considering that early Utah cases invalidated exculpatory clauses. 
The invalidation rule was first laid down in Jankele v. Texas Co. 35 In 
Jankele, the defendant's agent improperly installed a leaky gas tank on 
the plaintiff's land causing him to lose money. The defendant claimed 
that the exculpatory clause protected him from liability. The court held 
the clause invalid, stating: 
It is very doubtful that defendant could relieve itself by contract 
from its own negligence. Ordinarily such contracts are contrary to 
public policy. "Undoubtedly contracts exempting persons from liability 
for negligence induce a want of care, for the highest incentive to the 
exercise of due care rests in a consciousness that a failure in this respect 
will fix liability to make full compensation for any injury resulting from 
30. Scudder, 858 P.2d at 1009 (emphasis added). 
31. 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993). 
32. /d. at 998. 
33. Ericksen, 858 P.2d at 998. 
34. It is important to note that reference to negligence is not explicitly stated in the 
clause. /d. Thus, the clause would also have be invalidated under the El Paso rule, but maybe 
not under the Freund rule. 
35. 54 P.2d 425 (Utah 1936). 
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the cause. It has therefore been declared to be good doctrine that no 
person may contract against his own negligence. "36 
57 
Thus, exculpatory clauses were void under Utah law because they were 
against public policy. 37 
Twenty-three years after Jankle, the Utah Supreme Court handed 
down a decision in Vtblker Bank & Trust v. First Security Corp. 38 that 
reversed ]ankle and permitted companies to use exculpatory clauses. In 
Vtblker Bank, the guardian of beneficiaries of a lapsed life insurance 
policy brought suit "because of [the] bank's failure to pay premiums"39 
as it had a duty to do. The contract between the bank and the trustor had 
a "hold harmless" provision where the bank assumed "no liability 
whatsoever in the premises, and [the trustor] further agree[d] to hold [the 
bank] harmless of and from any and all claims arising [t]hereunder. "40 
The court invalidated the clause using a rule very similar to the El Paso 
rule, stating: 
[O]ne may contract to protect himself against liability for loss 
caused by his negligence, it is nevertheless well settled that contracts in 
which a party attempts to do so are subject to strict construction against 
him; and further, that he will be afforded no protection unless the 
preclusion against the negligence is clearly and unequivocally stated.41 
36. /d. at 427 (citing 6 R.C.L § 132, p. 727). 
37. This differs from the original indemnity rule (El Paso) which generally allowed 
indemnity clauses if they were clearly and unequivocally expressed. 
The American Law Reports recognized Utah as one of the minority states that in dicta has 
"unqualifiedly laid down" the rule that "one cannot avoid liability for negligence by contract." 
K.A. Drechsler, Annotation, Limiting Liability for Own Negligence, 175 A.L.R. 8, 14 (1927). 
The language is arguably not dicta because the court did invalidate the clause as void as against 
public policy. Even so, the American Law Report makes it clear that this was the rule in Utah. 
Later cases, such as Allen v. Southern Pac. Co., 213 P.2d 667 (Utah 1950), also support 
the proposition that exculpatory clauses are void as against public policy. In Allen, the plaintiff 
"brought [an] action against the Southern Pacific Company to recover $2,190 for (a] traveling 
bag and contents which were lost from defendant's checkroom in [the] railroad station." /d. 
The court held that "[t]he great weight of authority is that a bailee cannot entirely exempt 
himself by contract from liability due to his negligence and contracts limiting his liability for 
negligence during the course of a general business with the public are usually regarded as being 
against public policy." /d. at 668 (See, 6 AM. JUR. Bailments § 176). The court did not cite 
Jankele, so this case can be read two ways. First, it could be read as following Jankele, that 
exculpatory clauses are void as against public policy. Second, in could be read very narrowly 
to say that exculpatory clauses are only void in the bailee/bailor situation. Given these two 
readings of the case, it really does not help a practitioner understand whether exculpatory 
clauses are void as against public policy in Utah. 
38. 341 P.2d 944 (Utah 1959). 
39. /d. 
40. /d.at947. 
41. /d. at 947 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, exculpatory clauses, like indemnity clauses,42 must be clearly 
stated. 43 
Nineteen years after V'.blker, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
the El Paso clear-expression standard applies to exculpatory clauses. In 
DuBois v. Nye, 44 vendors brought an action against the purchasers to 
recover for fire damage caused by the purchasers the day before the 
house was conveyed. The purchasers claimed that a clause in the sales 
contract exculpated them from their own negligence. The court cited El 
Paso, stating "[t]he broad language as to the 'risk of loss' cannot be 
construed as a clear, unequivocal expression that is intended to include 
loss due to the negligent or intentional wrongful conduct of either 
party. "45 Thus, it appears that El Paso is the rule for exculpatory clause 
cases. 46 
C. Limitation of Damages Clauses 
Limitation of damages clauses limit the amount of damages an 
injured party may receive. The standard for this type of clause is 
outlined in a 1983 case DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co. 47 In DCR, a 
burglar alarm company claimed that the damages it must pay for a faulty 
alarm system were limited.48 The clause in question read as follows: 
"[L]iability hereunder shall be limited to a fixed sum of $50.00, as 
liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, and this liability shall be exclu-
42. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
43. In Howe Rents Corp. v Worthen, 420 P.2d 848 (Utah 1966), the Utah Supreme Court 
added confusion to exculpatory clause law. The case is similar to Walker Bank but it is 
between a bailor and bailee. ld. No reference is made to Allen which is also factually similar. 
Instead the court cites El Paso and the indemnity line of case as the rule. After Howe Rents 
and Walker Bank, one could infer that the indemnity's clear and unequivocal rule from El Paso 
applies to exculpatory clauses. 
In Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stephens, 572 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1977), which came after Howe 
Rents, the court adding dicta in a concurring opinion. This case addressed waiver of a 
materialman's lien and did not directly address exculpatory clauses. The concurring opinion 
makes the point that a subcontractor cannot waive his lien "the same as the court would 
ordinarily refuse to enforce a covenant to waive a right for redress for future negligence." !d. 
at 1382 (concurring opinion). No citation for this statement exists but it sounds similar to the 
Jankele rule. This case has no precedential value with regard to exculpatory clauses, but it 
illustrates the potential confusion surrounding exculpatory clauses. 
44. 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978). 
45. ld. at 826-827. 
46. The problem with this assumption, however, is that the decision is pre-Freund and 
Ericksen. No subsequent case exists either validating or invalidating exculpatory clauses in 
Utah after Freund and Ericksen. Therefore, the law concerning exculpatory clauses is more 
in question than that of indemnity clauses because it is unclear whether these rules apply. 
47. 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983). 
48. ld. at 433-434. 
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sive. "49 Although this clause was originally drafted as a liquidated 
damages clause, 50 under the facts of the case the clause operated as a 
limitation of damages clause because it does not fix liability between 
parties for breach of contract, but for negligence. The court cited El 
Paso as the rule for limitation of damages clauses,51 stating that in El 
Paso "this court refused to enforce a very detailed and thorough 
exculpatory clause. "52 The court proceeds to invalidate the clause under 
the El Paso rule claiming that "[i]n the present case, the language 
employed by the parties does not 'clearly and unequivocally' express an 
intent to limit defendant's tort liability. "53 
D. Application of Utah Case Law in the Federal Courts 
The federal court cases provide an interesting twist on this analysis 
as the district and circuit courts have attempted to apply Utah law. 
Federal courts have addressed two types of clauses: releases and 
indemnity clauses. 
1. Release Clauses 
Only two federal district court cases address Utah law regarding 
release clauses. Both post-Freund and Ericksen, but the cases do not 
apply the standards from either case. 
The first federal case is Zollman v. Myers. 54 In Zollman, a 
snowmobile driver injured in an accident brought a negligence action 
against the recreational park and the driver of the other snowmobile with 
which she collided. 55 The rental agreement contained a clause that 
released the park from any liability "even if they or any of them 
negligently caused the bodily injury or property damage. "56 The 
plaintiff advanced two arguments to invalidate the release: First, she 
49. !d. at 437. 
50. Liquidated damages clauses are invalidated or validated under different rules and will 
not be discussed in this comment. 
51. !d. 
52. !d. This incorrect characterization of El Paso as an exculpatory clause, added to the 
fact that the court never recognized the DCR clause as a limitation of damages clause, puts the 
court's analysis and the applicability of the rule in question. 
53. !d. at 438. Because this case is pre-Freund and Ericksen, the question of whether 
those rules apply to limitation of damages clauses is unanswered. This case is the only 
limitation of damages case in Utah analyzed under limited liability clause rules. 
54. 797 F. Supp. 923 (D. Utah 1992). 
55. !d. 
56. !d. at 925 n.l. 
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argued that this type of release is against public policy;57 second, she 
asserted that "release agreements are not favored in Utah law. "58 
The Zollman court did not accept the first argument which the 
plaintiff based on a public policy statute regarding off-road vehicles. 59 
However, the court accepted the second argument and found the clause 
invalid. At the beginning of its analysis, the court cited El Paso60 but 
made no further reference to it. Instead, the court rested its decision on 
an ambiguity analysis based upon a clause in the contract that stated "I 
hereby agree to stop my snowmobile and wait for proper instructions. 
Otherwise, I expressly agree to assume the risk presented by the situation 
or problem. "61 The court declared that "if Zollman stops and awaits 
instructions when encountering a hazardous situation, she does not 
assume the risk of an accident. "62 Thus, the court holds, this clause 
conflicts with the "even if they or any of them negligently caused the 
bodily injury or property damage" 63 statement. The court finds the 
clause "ambiguous" under normal contract principles, not under the El 
Paso rule. 64 Thus, it appears that courts will require that release clauses 
be more than merely "clearly expressed" in order to avoid ambiguity. 
Under the El Paso rule the clause may have been held unambiguous 
because the clause contained reference to release the renter from his own 
57. Id. at 926. 
58. ld. 
59. The plaintiff's public policy argument was that the Utah Code implicitly disallowed 
release agreements for rental and training on off-road vehicles. The statute reads as follows: 
It is the policy of this state to promote safety and protection for persons, 
property, and the environment connected with the use, operation, and equipment of 
off-highway vehicles, to promote uniformity of law, to adopt and pursue a safety 
education program, and to develop trails and other facilities for the use of these 
vehicles. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-22-1 (1991). 
The court held that "the Act deals almost exclusively with the registration of and the 
restrictions on the operation of off-highway vehicles, such as snowmobiles .... and in no place 
suggests that parties providing such training cannot seek to limit their liability." Zollman, 797 
F. Supp. at 926-927. 
60. Zollman, 797 F. Supp. at 926 n.4. 
61. !d. at 926 n.6. 
62. !d. at 928. 
63. ld. at 925 n.l. 
64. See, ld. at 927-928. This opens the question of whether limited liability analysis 
applies to release clauses in Utah. The opinion can be read many ways. First, the court might 
not have followed the Freund rule because this was not a commercial contract with two parties 
at arm's length. Normally, as in this case, the release language is found in a standard rental 
form contract where the renter has no bargaining power, and usually does not even fully read 
the contract. So, arguably, the Freund rule does not apply. 
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negligence. 65 However, by citing El Paso's "not favored language, "66 
and using normal ambiguity principles, the federal district court came up 
with a standard that is more strict than that which the Utah Supreme 
Court applies. Under the federal court's holding, any ambiguity or 
conflict with the release clause, even from other sections of the contract, 
will invalidate the clause. This standard would invalidate many limited 
liability clauses. 
In the second case, Ghionis v. Deer Ullley Resort Co. , 67 a " [ s ]ki 
equipment lessee brought [an] action against [the] lessor/operator of [a] 
ski resort, alleging negligence ... in connection with a ski accident in 
which she injured her knee. "68 The court held that the release was 
ambiguous and cited the El Paso standard in holding that: "[E]xculpatory 
agreements are binding so long as they are clear and unequivocal in 
expressing the parties' agreement to absolve a defendant of liability. 
General language of release, however, without specificity as to the 
shifting of responsibility is not enough to relieve a party at fault from 
liability. "69 However, the court continued, asserting that "[t]he Release 
document is also ambiguous. "7° Citing Zollman, the court held that 
"like the release in Zollman the court finds the Deer Valley Release is 
65. See, e.g., Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990) 
(implying that specific reference to exculpating one's negligence would pass the El Paso test); 
Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1983)(upholding 
an indemnity clause that contained reference to indemnitee's negligence). 
66. Zollman, 797 F. Supp. at 926. 
67. 839 F. Supp. 789 (D. Utah 1993). 
68. /d. 
69. /d. at 793 (citations omitted). Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 341 
P.2d 944 (Utah 1959), cited in Ghionis, is an exculpatory clause case decided before El Paso, 
but it clearly uses a rule similar to the El Paso standard. 
70. Ghionis, 839 F. Supp. at 793. 
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ambiguous. "71 Thus, it appears that, at the federal level at least, 
Zollman can be considered a separate rule and will apply.72 
2. Indemnity and Exculpatory Clauses 
The federal courts have done a better job interpreting indemnity and 
exculpatory clauses than release cases.73 In three cases from 1966 to 
1971, the Tenth Circuit correctly applied the El Paso standard to validate 
two clauses and to invalidate one. 74 
71. /d. The ambiguity is created by conflict between paragraphs seven and ten. 
Paragraph seven reads: 
I hereby release the ski shop, and its owners, agents and employees from any and 
all liability for damages and injury to myself or to any person or property resulting 
from negligence, installation, maintenance, the selection, adjustment and use of this 
equipment, accepting myself the full responsibility for any and all such damage or 
injury which may result. 
/d. at 792-93 n.2. 
The court claims that this conflicts with paragraph ten, which reads: "All instructions on 
the use of my rental equipment have been made clear to me, and I understand the function of 
my equipment." /d. The court held that statement was untrue "[w]here those instructions are 
lacking or deceptive, as is claimed by Ghionis on the compatibility of her boots and the ski 
binding, the release clause of paragraph 7 does not apply." /d. at 794. This is quite a stretch 
to find ambiguity. On their face the two paragraphs do not conflict; the only conflict was that 
factually paragraph ten was not a true statement. The court implies the invalidation of 
paragraph seven by way of paragraph ten. 
72. In essence, the Zollman standard is that any ambiguity, or stretch of ambiguity will 
invalidate the clause. 
73. This may be because the indemnity and exculpatory clause cases were in the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. 
74. The federal district court also passed several decisions dealing with indemnity and 
exculpatory clauses. For example, the federal district court followed the El Paso rule in a case 
called Wollam v. Kennecott Corp. 663 F. Supp. 268 (D. Utah 1987). In Wollam, the court 
invalidated a clause that had no reference to negligence. It stated that the "contract suffers 
from the same lack of specificity found deficient in El Paso. The general language ... fails 
expressly to state that Stockmar will indemnify Kennecott for Kennecott's negligence." /d. at 
272. 
After the 1990 Freund decision, the district court ignored Freund in CIG Exploration Inc. 
v. Hill. 824 F. Supp. 1532 (D. Utah 1993). In that case, a "[g]as pipeline operator brought 
[an] action seeking reimbursement from royalty interest owners of that portion of royalties 
attributable to overcharges reimbursed to customers." /d. at 1532-33. Citing the El Paso rule 
and several of its progeny, including the district court opinion of Freund, the court held that 
the indemnity clause was invalid. /d. at 1541-42. 
Under the El Paso rule, this decision properly held the clause invalid because it did not 
contain specific language indemnify CIG from its own negligence. The problem with the 
holding is that this is a commercial contract so the Freund rule should have applied. Under 
the Freund rule, this clause would pass because it could "be 'clearly implied from the lan-
guage,"' Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362,370 (Utah 1990), that CIG is to 
be saved "harmless from and against any and all loss, cost, expense or damage it may suffer." 
CIG Exploration, 824 F. Supp. at 1541. Thus, CIG can be read to imply that the Freund rule 
is not valid, or that it is valid but this was not a commercial context with parties bargaining at 
arm's length. The court made no statement one way or the other. 
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In the first case, Titan Steel Corporation v. Walton/5 a general 
contractor and owner sued for indemnity from a subcontractor whose 
employee fell through a roof and died. 76 The clause contained the 
language, "except when caused by the sole negligence of the Contractor 
or Owner. "77In addition to examining Utah law, the court recognizes a 
federal view: "The federal view is that they [indemnity clauses] are 
contrary to public policy, especially contracts affected with a public 
interest and involving a public duty. "78 The court then went on to apply 
the El Paso clear-expression standard to validate the clause. 79 
In the next case, United States Steel v. Warner, 80 a similar analysis 
invalidated an exculpatory clause. In Warner, the plaintiff, an indepen-
dent contractor, brought and action against the defendant for injuries 
sustained from falling through a roof. The clause between the parties, 
stated that the "safety of all persons ... shall be the sole responsibility 
of the Contractor. "81 The court correctly cited El Paso as the governing 
rule and held that the provision was invalid. The court stated that "the 
intent to relieve the defendant from its own negligence is not clearly and 
unequivocally expressed." 
Finally, in Southern Pacific Trans. Co. v. Nielsen, 82 the same court 
again validated a indemnity clause. In Nielson, the railroad brought suit 
against the purchaser of a railroad bridge for indemnification when one 
of the purchaser's employees was killed. 83 The clause said that the 
buyer would indemnify the railroad from all liability, "regardless of any 
negligence or alleged negligence on the part of any Railroad employee or 
agent. "84 The Tenth Circuit, in three decisions, cited El Paso and 
carefully maneuvered its way through Utah law to validate the clause 
because it specifically included the railroad's negligence. 
75. 365 F.2d 542 (lOth Cir. 1966). 
76. /d. 
77. /d. at 548. 
78. !d. This rule is similar to thelankele rule found in the old exculpatory clause cases. 
79. !d. at 548-49. 
80. 378 F.2d 995 (lOth Cir. 1967). 
81. /d. at 999 (alterations in original). 
82. 448 F.2d 121 (lOth Cir. 1971). 
83. /d. at 121-122. 
84. /d. at 122. 
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E. The Special Exception: Indemnity Clauses in Construction 
Contracts and Design Professionals 
1. Construction Contracts 
A construction contract commonly includes indemnity clauses. The 
Utah legislature has decided that in these contracts indemnity provisions 
are void as against public policy. The Utah Code states: 
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding in, or in 
connection with or collateral to, a contract or agreement relative to the 
construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of a building, structure, 
highway, appurtenance and appliance, including moving, demolition and 
excavating connected therewith, purporting to indemnify the promisee 
against liability for damages arising out of bodily injury to persons or 
damage to property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of 
the promisee, his agents or employees, or indemnitee, is against public 
policy and is void and unenforceable. 
This act will not be construed to affect or impair the obligations of 
contracts or agreements, which are in existence at the time the act 
becomes effective. 85 
This is a special exception to the rules outlined above and the clause only 
qualifies if the contract is for construction. The indemnity clause limits 
damages for physical injury or property damage and the limits liability 
for indemnitee's sole negligence. If these conditions exist, the clause is 
void. 86 Many contracts get around this obstacle with an "except for the 
sole negligence of indemnity" clause. 87 With this clause the contract 
and its indemnity provision will be upheld. 88 
85. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-8-1 (1991). 
86. See, e.g., Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Blaine Constr., 863 P.2d 1329 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993), appeal dismissed, 878 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1994); Wollam v. Kennecott Corp. 663 F.Supp 
268 (D. Utah 1987). 
87. See, e.g., Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 858 P.2d 1005 (Utah App. 
1993)("excluding any liability caused by sole negligence or willful misconduct of Owner or 
Manager."), rev 'd 886 P.2d 49 (Utah 1994)(reversing on grounds unrelated to the indemnifica-
tion agreement); Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 n.l 
(Utah 1983)("except where such injury, death or damage has resulted from the sole negligence 
of Operator."); Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542, 548 (lOth Cir. 1966)("except when 
caused by the sole negligence of the Contractor or Owner."); cf Southern Pacific Trans. Co. 
v. Nielsen, 448 F.2d 121, 122 (lOth Cir. 197l)("regardless of any negligence or alleged 
negligence on the part of any Railroad employee or agent."). 
88. See, e.g., Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 858 P.2d 1005 (Utah App. 
1993)("excluding any liability caused by sole negligence or willful misconduct of Owner or 
Manager."), rev 'd 886 P .2d 49 (Utah 1994 )(reversing on grounds unrelated to the indemnifica-
tion agreement); Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 n.l 
(Utah 1983)("except where such injury, death or damage has resulted from the sole negligence 
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2. Design Professionals 
A design professional is defined as "an architect, engineer, or land 
surveyor. It includes any other person who, for a fee or other compensa-
tion, performs services similar to the services of an architect, engineer, 
or land surveyor in connection with the development of land. "89 
A contract for services performed by design professionals may not 
limit the design professional's or landowner's liability to either the 
contractor or subcontractor. 90 This rule does not apply if the design 
professional is also hired to construct the project91 and no exception 
exists for clauses that exempt sole negligence.92 Thus, this restriction 
is more rigid that the construction industry rule. 
of Operator."); Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542, 548 (lOth Cir. 1966)("except when 
caused by the sole negligence of the Contractor or Owner."); cf. Southern Pacific Trans. Co. 
v. Nielsen, 448 F.2d 121, 122 (lOth Cir. 1971)("regardless of any negligence or alleged 
negligence on the part of any Railroad employee or agent."). 
89. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-8-2(1)(c) (1991). 
90. The relevant statute states: 
(2) An agreement between an owner and a contractor may not limit the owner's or 
a design professional's liability to the contractor for any claim arising from services 
performed by the design professional in connection with the development of land. 
This subsection does not apply if the owner and the contractor are the same person 
or entity or ar controlled by the same person or entity. 
(3) An agreement between a contractor and a subcontractor may not limit the 
owner's or a design professional's liability to the subcontractor for any claim arising 
from services performed by the design professional in connection with the develop-
ment of land. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-8-2(2)-(3) (1991). 
91. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-8-2(4) (1991) states: "This section does not apply if the 
design professional is retained under a single contract to perform both the design and the 
construction of the project, such as in a design-build or turn-key project." 
92. The statute gives no exceptions: 
(2) An agreement between an owner and a contractor may not limit the owner's or 
a design professional's liability to the contractor for any claim arising from services 
performed by the design professional in connection with the development of land. 
This subsection does not apply if the owner and the contractor are the same person 
or entity or ar controlled by the same person or entity. 
(3) An agreement between a contractor and a subcontractor may not limit the 
owner's or a design professional's liability to the subcontractor for any claim arising 
from services performed by the design professional in connection with the develop-
ment of land. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-8-2(2)-(3) (1991). 
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F. Limiting Liability Clause in Fraud Cases 
The majority rule for limiting liability clauses in fraud cases is that 
"[a] term unreasonably exempting a party from the legal consequences of 
a misrepresentation is unenforceable on grounds of public policy. "93 
The Utah Supreme Court applied this majority rule to a limitation of 
damages clause in a case called Lamb v. Bangart. 94 In Lamb, a 
purchaser brought an action for breach of warranty and fraud against the 
sellers of a livestock breading contract. The issues were whether a clause 
limiting the purchaser's damages to " [ e ]xoneration of the final payment 
... and tender of one half of the [bull's] semen"95 was valid in a fraud 
action. The court held that "a contract clause limiting liability will not 
be applied in a fraud action" and further "[a] contract limitation on 
damages or remedies is valid only in the absence of allegation or proof 
of fraud. "96 An old New York case, Bridger v. Goldsmith,97 gives an 
especially clear explanation of the rationale behind this rule: 
[T]here is no authority we are required to follow in support of the 
proposition that a party who has perpetrated a fraud upon his neighbor 
may nevertheless contract with him, in the very instrument by means of 
which it was perpetrated, for immunity against its consequences, close 
his mouth from complaining of it, and bind him never to seek redress. 
Public policy and morality are both ignored if such an agreement can 
be given effect in a court of justice. The maxim that fraud vitiates every 
transaction would no longer be the rule, but the exception. It could be 
applied then only in such case as the guilty party neglected to protect 
himself from his fraud by means of such a stipulation. Such a principle 
would in a short time break down every barrier which the law has 
erected against fraudulent dealing. 98 
Therefore, if a clause at issue in a fraud action bars liability completely 
or limits damages, it is invalid. 
The rule in Lamb was cited and upheld in a 1993 case, Ong 
International (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corporation. 99 There, a 
release between the partners "forever discharge[d] SLMM [defendant], 
its agents, officers and employees from any and all claims, demands, 
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 196 (1965). 
94. 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974). 
95. /d. at 608. 
96. /d. 
97. 38 N.E. 458 (N.Y. 1894). 
98. /d. at 459. 
99. 850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993). 
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rights of action or causes of action." 100 The court cited Lamb and held 
that "[t]he law does not permit a covenant of immunity which will protect 
a person against his own fraud on the ground of public policy. A 
contract limitation on damages or remedies is valid only in the absence 
of allegations or proof of fraud. " 101 No confusion exists in this area of 
limited liability clauses. They are simply not valid in the face of fraud. 
G. Summary 
As outlined above, the case law in Utah raises creates several 
standards for limited liability clauses. Below are the possible rules and 
their relationship to each other: 
Ericksen rule: Clause is 
sufficiently broadl02 
< ---Strict-------------------------------- I ----------------------------Lenient--- > 
Janke/e-Federal Zollman rule: any E1 Paso rule: clear Freund rule: im- Majority rule: 
rule: void, against conflict or am- & equivocal ex- plied from langua- valid unless emp-
public policy, biguity, releas- pression, specific, ge, purpose of a- Ioyer or charged 
exculpatory claus- es?J04 covers negligence, greement, sur- with public ser-
es.wl indemnity, rounding facts, for vice (all 
exculpatory? limi- conunercial, arms types)'o' 
tation of da- length transac-




100. /d. at 451 (citing Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974)). 
101. /d. at 452. 
102. Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993). 
103. See Allen v. Southern Pac. Co., 213 P.2d 667 (Utah 1950); Jankele v. Texas Co., 
54 P.2d 425, 427 (Utah 1936); Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (lOth Cir. 1966). 
See also Boise Cascade Corp. v Stephens, 572 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1977); K.A. Drechsler, 
Annotation, Limiting Liability for Own Negligence, 175 A.L.R. 8, 14 (1927). 
104. See Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 839 F. Supp. 789 (D. Utah 1993); Zollman 
v. Myers, 797 F. Supp. 923 (D. Utah 1992). 
105. See DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983)(limitation of damages 
clause); Howe Rent Corp. v. Worthen, 420 P.2d 848 (Utah 1966)(exculpatory clause); Union 
Pacific R.R. Co. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910 (Utah 1965)(indemnity clause). 
106. Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990). 
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 195 (1965). 
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Ill. CONCLUSION: How 10 DRAFT A LIMITED LIABILITY CLAUSE 
THAT WILL PASS THE SCRUTINY OF THE COURT 
Understanding the intricacies involved in Utah limited liability clause 
cases is essential to properly drafting a valid clause. Each holding must 
be taken into consideration when drafting the clause, especially in light 
of the fact that a clause could end up being used for a different purpose 
depending on how the controversy arises. 108 In spite of this potential, 
however, it is possible to draft a limited liability clause that will pass the 
scrutiny of the court. 
The best rule to drafting a valid clause would be to draft it so that it 
would pass the most strict rule that courts have used, even if the rule 
does not directly apply to the type of clause being drafted. The Jankele 
rule is the strictest and voids any clause limiting liability, making it 
impossible to draft a clause that would pass this standard. 109 The next 
standard is the Zollman rule. 110 Under Zollman, any potential conflict 
or ambiguity between the clause and other parts of the contract will 
invalidate the clause. Drafting a clause without these conflicts can be 
difficult with a large contract where many provisions could potentially 
conflict with the clause in question. The drafter must review the whole 
contract for conflicts or ambiguities using Zollman and Ghionis as 
examples."' 
The next standard is the El Paso rule. This standard requires that the 
parties clearly and unequivocally state their intentions to exculpate one 
party's negligence. The rule specifically requires that the clause clearly 
state that one party is exculpating the other party from its own negli-
gence. The clause in Nielsen is an excellent example of one that will 
pass the scrutiny of the court. This clause states that "regardless of any 
negligence or alleged negligence on the part of any . . . employee or 
agent. " 112 
While the Nielson clause passes the El Paso text, it would be found 
invalid under the Utah statute if it appeared in a construction con-
108. For example, a clause drafted to indemnify one party could end up being used as an 
exculpatory clause if a conflict arises between the contracting parties. 
109. See Allen v. Southern Pac. Co., 213 P.2d 667 (Utah 1950); Jankele v. Texas Co., 
54 P.2d 425, 427 (Utah 1936); Titan Steel Corp. v. Walton, 365 F.2d 542 (lOth Cir. 1966). 
See also Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stephens, 572 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1977); K.A. Drechsler, 
Annotation, Limiting Liability for Own Negligence, 175 A.L.R. 8, 12 (1927). 
110. See Ghionis v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 839 F. Supp. 789 (D. Utah 1993); Zollman 
v. Myers, 797 F. Supp. 923 (D. Utah 1992). 
111. See Ghionis, 839 F. Supp. 789; Zollman, 797 F. Supp. 923. 
112. Southern Pacific Trans. Co. v. Nielsen, 448 F.2d 121, 122 (lOth Cir. 1971). 
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tract. 113 For construction contracts, an appropriate clause is one similar 
to the clause in Shell Oil. A construction clause should include language 
to the effect that liability will not exist "except where such injury, death 
or damage has resulted from the sole negligence of Operator. " 114 
These clauses will pass the El Paso standard. 
The final standard is the Ericksen rule. Under Ericksen, the clause 
must be sufficiently broad to cover any situation that may arise. Because 
the situation is not known to the parties at the time they draft the clause, 
the Ericksen standard is difficult to meet. A clause that limits any and 
all liability from any and all possible parties should generally meet this 
standard. 115 
In conclusion, a clause that meets the Zollman, El Paso, and Ericksen 
standards will meet the more lenient Freund or majority rules. Drafting 
a clause to meet the requirements of these rules will allow the clause to 
pass the scrutiny of Utah courts. 
Trey Dayes 
113. UTAH CODE ANN. 13-8-1 (1991). 
114. Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 n.l. (Utah 
1983). 
115. The clause in Ericksen fell short because it missed any employees of the city. 
Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995, 998 (Utah 1993). 
